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INTRODUCTION
Courts, commentators, and companies have devoted enor-
mous time and energy to the problem of standard-essential
patents (SEPs)-patents that cover (or at least are claimed to
cover) industry standards. With billions of dollars at stake,
there has been a great deal of litigation and even more lobbying
and writing about problems such as how, if at all, standard-
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setting organizations (SSOs) should limit enforcement of patent
rights, whether a promise to license SEPs on fair, reasonable,
and non-discriminatory (FRAND)I terms is enforceable in court
or in arbitration, what a FRAND royalty is, and whether a re-
fusal to comply with a FRAND commitment violates antitrust
law.2
In this study, we explore what happens when SEPs go to
court. What we found surprised us.3 We expected that proving
infringement of SEPs would be easy-they are, after all, sup-
posed to be essential-but that the breadth of the patents
might make them invalid. In fact, the evidence shows the op-
posite. SEPs are more likely to be held valid than a matched
set of litigated non-SEP patents, but they are significantly less
likely to be infringed. SEPs, then, don't seem to be all that
essential, at least when they make it to court.
At least part of the explanation for this surprising result
comes from another one of our findings: many SEPs asserted in
court are asserted by non-practicing entities (NPEs),4 also
known as patent trolls. NPEs do much worse in court, even
when they assert SEPs. And the fact that they have acquired a
large number of the SEPs enforced in court may bring the
overall win rate down significantly. 5
Our results have interesting implications for the policy de-
bates over both SEPs and NPEs. Standard-essential patents
may not be so essential after all, in part because companies
tend to err on the side of over-disclosing patents that may or
may not be essential.6 The failure of NPEs to win cases even
I Yeah, we know, that's a lot of acronyms for the first paragraph of a paper.
Bear with us. It gets better.
2 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasona-
ble Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135,
1164-66 (2013) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Simple Approach]; Mark A. Lemley
& Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1991, 2016,
2043-44 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Holdup].
3 It should surprise you too.
4 There we go with the acronyms again.
5 See discussion infra subpart III.A.
6 Many authors have made the point that many patents declared to SSOs are
not actually essential. E.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and Standards-Es-
sential Patents, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPE-
TION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 209, 222-23 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2017); Robin
Stitzing et al., Over-Declaration of Standard Essential Patents and Determinants of
Essentiality 10 (2017) (available at https://ssm.com/abstract=2951617 [https://
perma.cc/E9WZ-D8LH]); Rudi Bekkers et al., Disclosure Rules and Declared Es-
sential Patents, 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23627,
2017). However, it is surprising to us that a substantial share of declared essen-
tial patents are found non-essential even after they have been carefully chosen for
litigation.
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with what seems like a strong set of patents raises interesting
questions about the role of NPEs in patent law and the policy
efforts to curb patent litigation abuse.
We discuss the background of SEPs in Part I. In Part II we
explain our study. We present our results in Part III and dis-
cuss some implications of those results in Part IV.
I
THE SEP CONTROVERSY
Standard-essential patents are so important and so con-
troversial because they are supposedly just that-essential to a
standard. Unlike most other patents, when a patent is truly
essential there is no way to design around it and still comply
with the standard. And industry standards are in turn critical
to major sectors of the market economy. The computer, In-
ternet, and telecommunications industries in particular de-
pend on standards to ensure that different companies'
products work together well.7 If you want your phone or com-
puter to connect wirelessly to the Internet, for instance, you
need to use WiFi. And using WiFi means sending and receiving
data according to a specific set of protocols. Those protocols
are patented. In fact, they are the subject of lots of patents, all
claimed to be necessary to implement WiFi. And if you want
your phone to be able to talk to other people's phones, you need
to implement the agreed protocol. Changing it to something
incompatible won't do-even if there were viable alternatives
before the standard was widely adopted.
Standards, then, are important. We want innovation in
new standards. But precisely because they are important, we
also worry that if patent holders have broad rights to exclude
other companies from practicing standards, it could interfere
7 See, e.g., Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to
Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the
Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 102-03 (2007); Daniel J. Gifford,
Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of Standard-Setting Issues Under the
Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws, 43 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 331, 336, 341-42
(2003); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organi-
zations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1896-97 (2002) [hereinafter Lermley, IP & SSOs];
Marc Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Stan-
dard-Setting Organizations, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1920, 1920 (2008); Carl Shapiro, Set-
ting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCI-
ETY 81, 81-84 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Shapiro,
Cooperation]; see also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses,
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119,
119, 138 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Shapiro, Navigating] (dis-
cussing the costs and benefits of compatibility and standards).
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with widespread adoption and therefore with interoperability.8
SSOs have responded by limiting the use of patents that cover
the standards they adopt. While a few SSOs require royalty-
free licensing of patents that cover a standard, others simply
require disclosure of the existence of those patents.9 Most
commonly, they permit the creation of standards that incorpo-
rate SEPs, but require patent owners to disclose patents that
may become essential and license their SEPs on FRAND terms
to anyone who adopts the standards. 10 Most SSOs have no
review of the content or essentiality of declared SEPs.11
Even subject to those limitations, SEPs are potentially ex-
tremely powerful. Because successful standards are adopted
by the entire industry, owning the right to be paid a license
every time that standard is used-even a FRAND price-can be
quite valuable. And if the patentee doesn't agree to (or seeks to
evade) a FRAND commitment, the possibility of an injunction
against a technology everyone has to adopt can be powerful
indeed.1 2 A number of scholars have worried about the risk of
patent holdup that could result. 13
8 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1029-31 (9th Cir. 2015);
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310-12 (3rd Cir. 2007); PATENT
CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETriNG IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM INFORMA-
TION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 17 (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds.,
2013); Shapiro, Cooperation, supra note 7, at 88; Joseph Farrell et al., Standard
Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRuST L.J. 603, 604-05 (2007); Geradin et
al., supra note 7, at 101; Gifford, supra note 7, at 367; Lemley, IP & SSOs, supra
note 7, at 1893; Shapiro, Navigating, supra note 7, at 136.
9 Lemley, IP & SSOs, supra note 7, at 1904.
10 Id. at 1906; see also Justus Baron & Daniel F. Spulber, Technology Stan-
dards and Standards Organizations: Introduction to the Searle Center Database,
27 J. ECON. MGMT. & STRATEGY 462, 478 (2018) (finding that of the thirty-six SSOs
studied, nine require FRAND licensing and twenty-two more provide patent hold-
ers with a menu of options, from which FRAND licensing is the least restrictive
option); Brad Biddle et al., How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirl-
cal Questions), 1 (2010), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id= 1619440 [https://perma.cc/Q42S-SDNZ] (finding that of the 197 laptop stan-
dards studied, 75% were developed under FRAND terms, and an additional 22%
under "royalty free" terms).
11 Stitzing et al., supra note 6, at 1 (finding "incentives for firms to over-
declare patents or at least to err towards declaring when in doubt").
12 For this reason, many SSOs require that standards be abandoned or rede-
signed if a key technology contributor withholds its FRAND commitment during
the development process. See, e.g., ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, ETSI
§ 8.1.1 (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.ets.org/images/files/IPR/ets-ipr-poli
cy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VGL-VTUT] (requiring any work on the standard to
cease if the key technology has no viable replacement).
13 E.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust
Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1152 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do
About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REv. 149, 149
(2007); Lemley & Shapiro, Holdup, supra note 2, at 2016; Dan L. Burk, Punitive
Patent Liability: A Comparative Examination (March 2, 2018), https://papers.
610
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Licensing SEPs is also complicated by the fact that prod-
ucts can incorporate many standards' 4 and multiple SEPs
cover most standards. Complex standards like WiFi and 3G
wireless communications attract hundreds and even
thousands of declared SEPs.1 5 If each of those patents is truly
essential, there is a risk of double-marginalization or "royalty
stacking" if each patent owner demands a disproportionate
share of the revenue from the product. 16 The FRAND commit-
ment can theoretically solve that problem, but only if a FRAND
royalty is based on the joint value of all the relevant SEPs
rather than the incremental contribution of a single SEP owner
considered in isolation, and only if the royalty is in fact
reasonable. 17
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3118029 [https://perma.cc/B4N4-
5KDZ] (arguing that injunctions in SEP cases are unduly punitive and that dam-
ages are a better remedy); Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado About Hold-Up, (2018)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3123245 [https://
perma.cc/CS5X-JKYU]. There are questions as to whether patent holdup is a
problem in practice. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, The Anti-Commons Revisited,
29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 127, 132-33 (2015) (asserting that markets can resolve
anti-commons effects through transactional solutions); Alexander Galetovic &
Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent-Holdup Theory, 13 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 1, 10 (2017) (arguing that patent-holdup theory ignores economic funda-
mentals). Qualcomm, a leading SEP holder in mobile telephony, is a critic of the
patent-holdup theory. See, e.g., FTC Patent Standards Workshop, Comments of
Qualcomm Incorporated, Project No. P11-1204 (June 13, 2011), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public-comments/request-com
ments-and-announcement-workshop-standard-setting-issues-project-no.p
111204-00011%C2%AO/00011-60525.pdf [https://perma.cc/RHD5-EPKP) (as-
serting there is no empirical evidence that license fees and market-driven negotia-
tions harm innovation or consumers, whereas monopsonistic bargaining by
manufacturers could discourage research and development).
14 See Biddle et al., supra note 10.
15 David J. Goodman & Robert A. Myers, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents,
PROCEEDINGS OF IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WIRELESS NETWORKS, COMMUNI-
CATIONS AND MOBILE COMPUTING 2 (2005), http://eeweb.poly.edu/dgoodman/wire
lesscom2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS6T-CNV4]; Lemley & Shapiro, Holdup,
supra note 2, at 2027-28.
16 Lemley & Shapiro, Holdup, supra note 2, at 1992-93. The basic Cournot
theory might yield different predictions, however, when licensees can challenge
patent portfolios with differing quality. Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, The Inverse
Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents, 3-4 (March
13, 2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2866389
[https://perma.cc/2RD4-JEP8].
17 For example, consider a standard that has a value of $10 if two SEPs-
owned by two different patentees-are included, and zero otherwise (that is, there
are no feasible alternative technologies). The marginal or incremental value of
each SEP is $10, but clearly that is not a FRAND royalty, since paying both SEP
holders $10 would lead to royalties that exceed the value of the standard. While
$5 is a natural candidate in this example, that assumes that all the value of the
standard should be attributed to patents and none to those who actually make
the products. See Lemley & Shapiro, Holdup, supra note 2, at 2041 n. 162. The
problem of dividing the total surplus becomes quite complex in more realistic
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:607
Given the value of SEPs, it is no surprise that they are
much more likely to be enforced in court than other kinds of
patents. One of us found in prior work that SEPs are more
than five times as likely to be litigated as comparable non-
SEPs.18 When those patents are enforced, virtually everything
about the FRAND commitment has proven to be controversial.
Litigants and scholars have fought about whether a FRAND
commitment prevents a patentee from getting an injunction,1 9
whether the fact that a patent is standard-essential should bar
an injunction even if there is no FRAND commitment,20
examples, and is beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., David Salant, Formu-
las for Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Royalty Determination, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE IEEE SIIT (2007), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?
arnumber=4629324 [https://perma.cc/FD3J-NL64]. For a suggestion that we
bring all SEP owners together in a single proceeding to allocate royalties and avoid
the royalty stacking problem, see Jason Bartlett & Jorge L. Contreras, Rational-
izing FRAND Royalties: Can Interpleader Save the Internet of Things?, 36 REV.
LITIG. 285 (2017).
18 Bekkers et al., supra note 6, at 3. Jorge Contreras finds that this is true of
telecommunications but not Internet patents, and he attributes that to the fact
that Internet standards deemphasize patent monetization. Jorge L. Contreras, A
Tale of Two Layers: Patents, Standardization, and the Internet, 93 DEN. L. REV.
855, 855 (2016).
19 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1049-52 (9th
Cir. 2015) (finding that Motorola violated its contractual reasonable and non-
discriminatory obligations by seeking injunctive relief); Apple Inc. v. Motorola,
Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (recognizing that a patentee subject
to FRAND commitments may have difficulty establishing irreparable harm and
therefore attaining an injunction, but noting that an injunction may be justified
where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays
negotiations); Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., Enjoining Injunctions: The Case Against
Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patent Holders Who Seek Injunctions, THE
ANTITRuST SOURCE (2014), https: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=2515949 [https://perma.cc/7M9U-WHFK] (asserting that antitrust law should
not limit a patent holder's right to seek injunction against infringing users be-
cause Supreme Court jurisprudence adequately prevents unwarranted injunc-
tions, an antitrust sanction would excessively deter SEP holders in need of
injunctions, and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine protects SEP holders who wish to
file for injunction); Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND's Forever: Standards,
Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 304-14 (2014)
(asserting that absent extreme circumstances, such as when an adopter refuses
to pay royalties at any price, neither injunctions nor exclusion orders should be
available to patentees bound by a FRAND commitment); Gregor Langus et al.,
Standard-Essential Patents: Who is Really Holding Up (and When)?, 9 J. COMPETI-
TION L. & ECON. 253, 253 (2013) (asserting that, in line with European practices,
courts should only grant injunctions if prospective licensees are unwilling to
make a FRAND royalty offer); Lemley & Shapiro, Simple Approach, supra note 2, at
1143-44 (asserting SSOs should require patent holders with FRAND commit-
ments to cede the right to seek injunctions against willing licensees, and should
require binding arbitration to remedy infringement).
20 See Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented
Standards, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 50 (2009). Cf. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,
773 F.3d 1201, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that in the damages context courts
612
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whether a patentee that makes a FRAND, commitment must
offer it to everyone or only willing licensees, 2 1 who is a willing
licensee, 22 whether the FRAND commitment is an enforceable
contract,2 3 who decides what royalty is FRAND, 24 what a
must separate the intrinsic value of a patent from the value It obtains as a result
of adoption as a standard). The logic of Ericsson might well lead a court to
conclude that a patentee could not satisfy the eBay factors for injunctive relief
with a standard-essential patent. See also Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley,
Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 8 (2012)
(discussing the problems with granting injunctions in SEP cases).
21 See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332-34 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's denial of an in-
junction because, in his view, if Apple was an unwilling licensee, Motorola would
have had strong support for its injunction request); Motorola Mobility LLC v.
Google Inc., No. C-4410, 2013 WL 3944149, 7 (F.T.C. July 13, 2013) (prohibiting
respondents from revoking or rescinding FRAND commitments, but finding ex-
ception where a potential licensee refuses to license the patent); Lemley & Sha-
piro, Simple Approach, supra note 2, at 1152-53 (arguing that a patentee who
makes a FRAND commitment is not obligated to license to someone who is unwill-
ing to accept reasonable terms set by an arbitrator during a binding arbitration).
22 See, e.g., Apple Inc., 757 F.3d at 1332-34 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (dis-
agreeing with the majority's denial of an injunction because, in his view, the
record contained evidence sufficient to create a dispute as to whether Apple was
an unwilling licensee); Lemley & Shapiro, Simple Approach, supra note 2, at 1142,
1152-53 (arguing that if a potential licensee refuses to participate in royalty-
setting arbitration, the licensee is unwilling and the patentee can sue for damages
and injunctive relief); Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Conission Sends Statement of
Objections to Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-
Essential Patents-Questions and Answers, EUROPA.EU (May 6, 2013), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO- 13-403_en.htm [https://perma.cc/
3W8F-NP75] (concluding that a licensee's acceptance of a binding, third party
determination for the terms of a FRAND license indicates the licensee's willing-
ness to enter a FRAND license).
23 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1037-38 (9th
Cir. 2015) (holding that enforcing a contractual commitment does not violate the
First Amendment); Motorola Mobility LLC v. Google Inc., No. C-4410, 2013 WL
3944149, 6 (F.T.C. July 13, 2013) (defining a "license agreement" as "a complete,
binding, enforceable agreement between the signatories to license the patents");
Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary
FRAND Commitment 4 (2010), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tractid= 1645878 [https://perma.cc/P43T-V4SV] (discussing the role of courts in
enforcing FRAND contractual commitments); Damien Geradin et al., The Comple-
ments Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence On Royalty Stack-
ing 6-20 (2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=949599
[https://perma.cc/936R-624A] (arguing that enforcement costs limit enforce-
ment of patent claims); Lemley, supra note 7, at 1909-11 (discussing the enforce-
ability of SSO bylaws).
24 See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, Simple Approach, supra note 2, at 1138-39
(recommending baseball-style binding arbitration to determine royalty rates); J.
Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETETON L. &
ECON. 931, 934-45 (2013) (asserting that reasonable-royalty damages should fall
between the minimum royalty a patent holder would accept and the maximum
royalty the infringer would be willing to pay, approximating the price that parties
would have bargained for ex ante in a voluntary exchange).
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FRAND royalty rate actually is, 2 5 and what the consequences
are of reneging on a FRAND commitment.2 6 The fights have
produced not only some of the longest court opinions in his-
tory, 27 but also extraordinary efforts by companies like
Qualcomm to fund scholarship and even entire centers at uni-
versities devoted to influencing the answers to these
questions.28
Despite this outpouring of litigation and scholarship, we
actually know surprisingly little about the enforcement of
SEPs. We have good evidence on what organizations actually
25 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 795 F.3d at 1040-45 (upholding the district
court's reasonable and non-discriminatory determination for Motorola's patents);
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1229-35 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding that jury instructions on reasonable and non-discriminatory obligations
should avoid rote reference to particular damages formulas, should distinguish
between value that SEP holders added with their invention and value the inven-
tion gained by becoming standard essential, and should refrain from mentioning
patent-holdup and royalty stacking absent evidence of holdup and stacking);
Realtek Semiconductor, Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. 12-CV-3451, 2014 WL 2738216,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2014) (upholding ajury verdict that decided the reasona-
ble and non-discriminatory royalty rate using substantial expert testimony and
other evidence); Golden Bridge Tech. v. Apple Inc., No. 12-CV-4882, 2014 WL
2194501, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2014) (excluding expert testimony on how to
calculate royalty base and rate because of the expert's methodology); In re Innova-
tio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11-CV-9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3,
2013) (deciding the RAND rate based on the testimony of five experts).
26 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310-17 (3rd Cir. 2007);
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-220, 2017 WL 2774406, at *5-6
(N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017); Microsoft Mobile Inc. v. Interdigital, Inc., No. 15-CV-
723, 2016 WL 1464545, at *1-3 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2016); Apple Inc. v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-1846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *2-4, *7, *9, *13 (N.D. Cal. May
14, 2012); Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 791,
797 (N.D. Tex. 2008); ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., 5 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST
§ 34.53.50 (2018); Lemley, supra note 13, at 157-58.
27 See Microsoft Corp., 795 F.3d at 1024-57.
28 To be sure, companies on both sides have funded work in this area. But
Qualcomm's investment has been extraordinary, and has led to the creation of
entire centers as well as funding scholarly papers. See, e.g., HOOVERIP2.ORG,
https://hooverip2.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/4MRZ-SXUH] (acknowledging
financial support from Qualcomm); TILEC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2007), https://
uvtapp.uvt.nl/tsb 11/nb.nblib.frmtoonnieuwsbrief?vnieuwsbriefid=10764&v_
rubriek id=0&v taal= [https://perma.cc/2ET3-CDAK] (acknowledging
Qualcomm's $400,000 donation to TILEC for a five-year research and teaching
program); Qualcomn Gives $2 Million for Patent Research, NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER
SCHOOL OF LAW (Aug. 2013), https://www.law.northwestem.edu/campaign/gifts/
qualcomm/index.html [https://perma.cc/UQW4-BUH6] (acknowledging a $2
million donation to the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth);
U.S. Telecom Firm Boosts Research Funds at Tilburg University Law and Econom-
ics Center Beneficiary, GODUTCH.COM, http://www.godutch.com/newspaper/in
dex.php?id=1181 [https://perma.cc/3H9B-VTPT] (acknowledging Qualcomm's
C300,000 donation).
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impose what sorts of policies, 2 9 and at least access to evidence
on how many patents are declared essential to standards at
various SSOs. 3 0 More recently, a new study by Jorge Contreras
focuses on one of the questions we ask here: What happens
when NPEs enforce SEPs in court?3 ' Contreras began the pro-
cess of evaluating SEP litigation outcomes. His paper is impor-
tant, and has findings similar to ours, but lacks several pieces
of data we provide that tell a more complete story. These in-
clude validity vs. infringement data and a matched set of non-
SEPs for comparison.32
II
WHAT WE DID
We set out to understand how SEPs fared in court. We
hypothesized that compared to ordinary patents, SEPs would
fare well in court, at least when it came to infringement. After
all, these are patents owned by companies that participated in
developing the standard and which they identified as essential
to the practice of that standard. In most cases the patentees
have agreed to forego certain remedies, including injunctions,
in order to promote the adoption of the standard their patent
covers.33 That should make proving infringement easy: it will
usually be undisputed that the defendant practices the stan-
29 See, e.g., PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY,
supra note 8, at 31-49 (reviewing and comparing twelve major SSOs' policies
regarding IP rights management and licensing rules); Benjamin Chiao et al., The
Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis, 38 RAND J. ECON.
905, 919-27 (2007) (examining the relationship between concessions SSOs de-
manded and the orientation of these SSOs to sponsors relative to users); Lemley,
supra note 7, at 1903-09 (surveying the rules and bylaws of forty-three different
SSOs, finding significant variation in policies, and observing that this diversity
makes it difficult for IP owners to know, ex ante, what rules govern their rights).
30 Knut Blind et al., Study on the Interplay between Standards and Intellec-
tual Property Rights (IPRs) 29 (2011), http://www.iplytics.com/download/docs/
studies/iprstudy-final report en.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWE2-36981 ("Most
SSOs make databases of such FRAND declarations by IPR owners public, and
these databases allow us to identify, quantify and analyse the IPRs in stan-
dards . . . ."). For an example of a database provided by an SSO, see ETSI, http://
ipr.etsi.org/ [https://perma.cc/6WUW-ACT4]. For a privately generated
database providing an overview of all disclosed IPRs from thirteen major SSOs,
see Rudi Bekkers et al., Intellectual Property Disclosure in Standards Development.
PROCEEDINGS FROM NBER CONFERENCE ON STANDARDS, PATENTS, & INNOVATION TUCSON
(AZ) (2012), http://www.ssopatents.org/ [https://perma.cc/Z5AV-H662].
31 Jorge L. Contreras et al., Assertion of Standards-Essential Patents by Non-
Practicing Entities, in PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES AND COMPETITION POLICY 50 (D.
Daniel Sokol ed., 2017).
32 Id. at 10-13.
33 Lemley, IP & SSOs, supra note 7, at 1967; Lemley & Shapiro, Simple
Approach, supra note 2, at 1140.
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dard, so if the patent is necessary to practice the standard,
proving that fact should suffice to prove infringement.
A careful observer, however, might have some questions
regarding the "standard" narrative of SEP infringement. First,
patents that are declared to the SSO before the standard is
complete may not be infringed by the final version of the stan-
dard that the SSO adopts, so the plaintiff must still prove its
case on infringement. Second, major standards can have many
different features and components. Patents that are "essential"
to optional features may not be infringed by a particular imple-
mentation of the standard. Although this explains how it is
possible to find patents that are declared essential but not
infringed, we might still expect that careful selection of patents
to assert in litigation would minimize the number of such
cases.3 4
But infringement is not all there is to patent litigation.
Broad patent claims come at a cost. A patent that is suffi-
ciently broad that it can't be designed around might be more
likely invalid, because it is more likely to tread on the prior
art35 or because it is harder to describe and teach the full scope
of the invention.3 6 So, we also hypothesized that when SEPs go
to court they may be more likely than non-SEPs to be held
invalid. Our confidence in that hypothesis was weaker, be-
cause it assumes that SEPs are more powerful and more likely
to be infringed because they are broader than non-SEPs. That
might not be true. It might be that SEPs are narrow but
lucky-they just happen to cover the particular way we agreed
to do something, but very little else. In particular, if companies
are able to anticipate the direction that a standard will take
because they are participating in its development, it may be
possible to file narrow applications that are nevertheless likely
to be valid and essential.3 7 Or it might be that the patent was
essential because it was truly ground-breaking, and so it was
valid despite its importance and breadth.
34 It is also possible that cases are litigated because the claims of essentiality
are weak, and that defendants license truly essential patents without litigation to
judgment.
3s 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2018).
36 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018).
37 Byeongwoo Kang & Rudi Bekkers, Just-in-Time Patents and the Develop-
ment of Standards, 44 RES. POL'Y 1948, 1951 (2015); Cesare Righi, Essays on
Patent Examination and Standard Essential Patents 40-44 (2017) (Ph.D. disser-
tation, Boston University Questrom School of Business), https://open.bu.edu/
bitstream/handle/2144/23353/Righi_bu_0017E_13083.pdf?sequence=5
[https://perma.cc/AEE5-MHP3].
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To evaluate these hypotheses, we collected data on law-
suits for patents declared essential to a sample of thirteen
SSOs that maintain a publicly accessible database of SEP dis-
closures. The SSOs in our sample include the major global
standards-developing organizations (ISO, ITU and IEC), the
main U.S. representative to these multi-national groups (ANSI),
a set of SSOs that govern significant technology platforms in-
cluding cellular telephone infrastructure (ETSI), Wi-Fi (IEEE)
and the internet (IETF), and a handful of smaller organizations.
For these SSOs, we can identify 6,633 U.S.-issued U.S. utility
patents.38 We relied on the patent owner's self-identification of
SEPs to the SSO during the standard-setting process because
that is the primary source of public data. It is also what trig-
gers FRAND and other obligations with respect to third-party
standards implementers.
We merged our SEP data to the Lex Machina litigation file
and identified 422 patents that have been asserted in at least
one case.3 9 Because we are interested in litigation outcomes,
however, we limit our attention to the sub-sample of 355 pat-
ents where we have complete data on the outcome of at least
one case. 40 Those 355 patents were litigated in a total of 537
unique cases, but in many of those cases more than one SEP
was asserted, so we have a total of 1,446 SEP assertions.
We matched each SEP patent-case pair to a randomly-
selected non-SEP patent from the same patent class that was
filed in the same year and was first litigated in the same year as
its SEP "twin." The 355 matched non-SEPs were litigated in a
total of 1,175 unique cases with 1,633 total assertions. Thus,
our final analysis sample has a total of 3,079 assertions, but
our primary focus is on the 1,719 unique lawsuits, of which
just over 30% are SEP lawsuits. 4 '
38 Our baseline SEP data are publicly available at www.ssopatents.org
[https://perma.cc/Z5AV-H662]. For more information on the sample of SSOs,
and the process used to clean and harmonize the disclosure data, see Bekkers et
al., supra note 6, at n.8.
39 Lex Machina collects, processes, and refines litigation data from sources
such as PACER. It "identiffies] asserted properties (such as patents), findings,
and outcomes, including any damages awarded." LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachi
na.com/what-we-do/how-it-works/ [https://perma.cc/NME8-TLSVI.
40 Litigation outcomes can be missing because a patent was asserted before
the start of the Lex Machina data set, or more often, because the matter was still
pending as of May 2017.
41 Decisions on the same patent are not independent of each other. Nor are
decisions on different patents in the same suit. See John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity ofLitigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185,
245 (1998). To avoid skewing our results, we ran our results testing only the first
decision on each patent. As a robustness check we also ran an alternative specifi-
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TABLE 1: CASES IN OUR SAMPLE
Unique Unique Total Merits
Patents % Cases % Assertions % Decisions* %
Declared
SEP 355 50% 537 31% 1,446 53% 117 49%
Matched
Control 355 50% 1,175 69% 1,633 47% 123 51%
Total 710 1,712 3,079 240
We assign each SEP to the SSO where it was disclosed, and
if a patent was committed under more than one SSO patent
policy, we assigned it using the date of the first license commit-
ment. Table 2 shows the distribution of patents and cases/
assertions across the various standard-setting organizations in
our sample. 4 2
cation testing only one randomly selected patent from each case. In most of what
follows, we report only the results for the first decision on each patent.
42 The full list of SSOs in our disclosure data is:
ANSI = American National Standards Institute
ATIS = Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (a US telecom SDO
focused on hardware)
BBF = Broadband Forum
CEN = Comite Europen de Normalisation (a European NGO for standards
development)
CENELEC = European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (Europe's
answer to IEEE)
ETSI = European Telecommunications Standards Institute
IEC = International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE = Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IETF = Internet Engineering Task Force
ISO = International Organization for Standardization
ITU = International Telecommunications Union
JTC = Joint Technical Committee (a collaboration of ISO, IEC and ITU to set ICT
standards)
OMA = Open Mobile Alliance
TIA = Telecommunications Industry Association
In Table 2 we group these organizations. Big-I is the IEC, the ISO, and the ITU.
ANSI+ includes CEN, IEEE includes CENELEC, and OTHTEL (other telecom) in-
cludes other telecommunications SSOs that are not listed.
We observe no litigation for patents disclosed to CEN, CENELEC, and TIA because
few patents are disclosed to those SSOs.
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TABLE 2: SEPs AND UNIQUE CASES ALLOCATED BY SSO GROUP
Declared Total Cases/
SEPs % Cases % SEP
ANSI+ 32 9% 148 10% 4.6
BIG-I 57 16% 159 11% 2.8
ETSI 150 42% 590 41% 3.9
IEEE 58 16% 374 26% 6.4
IETF 22 6% 34 2% 1.5
OTHTEL 36 10% 141 10% 3.9
Total 355 1,446 4.1
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for SEPs asserted in at least one case
completed before May 2017 and assigned to an SSO based on the date of the first
recorded licensing commitment.
The overwhelming majority of the SEPs (95%) in our sam-
ple were subject to a FRAND commitment. There were two
patents disclosed with a royalty-free licensing commitment
(where litigation could have preceded the disclosure, or taken
place outside the scope of the standard); three patents dis-
closed with specific license terms; two patents where the li-
censing commitment was withheld; and thirteen "others"
where it was difficult to classify the nature of the licensing
commitment based on the information provided in the
disclosure.
We also determined whether a practicing entity or NPE
asserted each patent. Because the definition of an NPE is a
contested issue, 43 we used Lemley and Myhrvold's categoriza-
tion of patent plaintiffs into twelve different types.4 4 Our clas-
sification is based on the entity status coded by the Stanford
NPE Litigation Database.4 5 We ran two different specifications,
one treating an NPE as any entity that was not purely a product
43 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM IN-
TELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 629-31 (2008) (discussing the appropriate
definition of "patent troll" and arguing that universities generally do not fit the
definition); James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll* An Alternative
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189,
192-93, 197-200 (2006); Gene Quinn, In Search of a Definition for the Term
"Patent Troll", IPWATCHDOG (July 18, 2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/
07/18/definition-patent-trollH/id=11700/ [https://perma.cc/U7W6-KZPY]; Pat-
ent Trolls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND, https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-
patent-troll-victims [https://perma.cc/BVB9-P9QT].
44 John R_ Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of
the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2009).
45 Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset, SLS, https://1aw.stanford.edu/projects/
stanford-npe-litigation-dataset/#slsnav-brief-dataset-methodology [https://
perma.cc/P7Q8-FJDL].
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company, and one defining a case as brought by a product
company if at least one plaintiff was a product company or the
IP subsidiary of a product company, even if other plaintiffs
were not. We use this latter, narrower definition of NPE in the
remainder of our analysis, but our results don't change signifi-
cantly using the alternative specification. 4 6
For each case we used outcome data from Lex Machina.4 7
We report whether the case went to a merits decision and, if so,
which party won the first case involving that patent to get to a
merits decision.4 8 We also report whether the merits decision
involved infringement or validity.
III
FINDINGS
A. Descriptive Statistics
Based on our narrower definition of NPEs, 719 of the 2,647
total (SEP and non-SEP) assertions, or 27.2%, were made by
practicing entities and the remainder by NPEs. The fact that
NPEs brought roughly three-fourths of the assertions may sur-
prise some, given that previous work suggests NPEs file just
over half of all lawsuits. 49 We think this is at least in part an
artifact of the nature of the industries we studied. Previous
studies have shown that NPE suits are far more prevalent in
the computer, Internet, and telecommunications industries
that are also responsible for most standard-setting activity.
Notably, the prevalence of NPEs in our sample is not due to
the non-SEP cases. There is relatively little difference between
46 Appendix A lists the full breakdown of entities in each entity status
category.
47 LEX MACHINA, https://exmachina.com/ [https://perma.cc/4RVQ-XYBZI.
48 As noted above, in alternative specifications we evaluate the results in all
cases involving a patent, not just the first case. But multiple decisions on the
same patent are not unrelated events, so it is difficult to draw useful inferences
from that alternative specification.
49 Robin Feldman et al., The ALA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Moneti-
zation Entities 9 (U.C. Hastings Research Paper No. 45, 2013), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2247195 ihttps://perma.cc/MBU3-
JPBC] (finding that "patent monetization entities filed 58.7% of the patent law-
suits in 2012"); RPX Corp., NPE Litigation, PATENT MARKETPLACE, AND NPE Cost 9
(2015), https://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/07/RPX-
2015-Report-072616.FinalZ.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6UP-MYNM; 2016 Annual
Patent Dispute Report, UNIFIED PATENTS (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.unifiedpat
ents.com/news/2016/12/28/2016-annual-patent-dispute-report [https://per
ma.cc/9ZLE-XCDX] (finding that NPEs accounted for approximately 55% of all
new patent cases in 2016). That number has increased over time, see Love, infra
note 88, at 1309, so NPEs may have been a smaller share of overall patents
litigated in the earlier years of our data set.
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the share of SEPs and non-SEPs that NPEs asserted, as we
show in Table 3.
TABLE 3: ASSERTIONS OF SEPs VS. NON-SEPS BY NPES AND
PRODUCT COMPANIES 5 0
NPE NPE Avg. Cases Avg. Cases
Patent Case per NPE per Non-NPE
Share Share Patent Patent
Declared
SEP 37% 71% 7.5 2.3
Matched
Control 46% 75% 8.4 2.5
Total 42% 73% 8.0 2.4
The numbers remain virtually indistinguishable (and the
differences remain statistically insignificant) if we limit our
study to the number of unique cases. By contrast, the NPE
share drops dramatically if we count only unique patents as-
serted. NPEs assert less than half of the patents, and only
37.6% of the SEPs in our sample. 5 1 That's because NPEs in
our sample filed many more cases per patent than did practic-
ing entities. 52
NPEs, then, are responsible for a high percentage of the
SEP assertions in our sample-over 70%. That number is par-
ticularly remarkable because we selected our SEPs from the
universe of patents disclosed to the SSO at the time the stan-
dard was adopted. NPEs are much less likely to participate in
SSOs than practicing entities, so most of those cases involve
patents that NPEs bought in the secondary market. NPEs
make much more intensive use of the patents they do acquire,
asserting them in more than three times as many cases as
product companies do.
The rate at which NPEs assert patents varied quite a lot
across the different SSOs we studied. NPE assertion rates
50 The difference in the NPE share of total assertions between SEPs and
matched controls is statistically significant using the narrow definition of NPEs
but not when using the broader definition.
51 If we use the broader definition of NPEs, the percentage of patents asserted
by NPEs is around 50%, but the difference between assertion of SEPs and non-
SEPs is no longer statistically significant.
52 For similar results using a somewhat different methodology, see Jorge L.
Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards Outsiders and Unencumbered Pat-
ents, 12 J. COMPETMON L. & ECON. 1 (2016); Michael Risch, A Generation ofPatent
LItigation, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 67 (2015); John R Allison et al., Patent Quality
and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677 (2011).
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ranged from a low of 31% in the "Big-I" grouping (a group of
large multinational SSOs comprising the IEC, the ISO, and the
ITU) to a high of 85% of the assertions of patents committed to
the IEEE.5 3
TABLE 4: SHARE OF NPE ASSERTIONS BY SSO
Declared Matched
SS0 Group SEP Control
ANSI+ 80% 86%
BIG-I 31% 61%
ETSI 78% 77%
IEEE 85% 70%
IETF 38% 33%
OTHTEL 45% 83%
Assertions (N) 1,220 1,427
There doesn't seem to be any obvious relationship between
the subject matter of the SSOs or their IP policies, and the
share of NPE assertions. But it seems clear that patents essen-
tial to some SSOs, including ANSI, ETSI, and the IEEE, are
more likely to be purchased by the NPEs who assert them.
Further evidence for this is found by comparing the SEP and
Control columns in Table 4. There is considerable variance
between the likelihood that a patent essential to a particular
SSO is asserted by an NPE and the likelihood that its matched
counterpart is asserted by an NPE.54
This differentiation suggests, though it does not prove, that
SSO policies or at least member norms have a sizeable effect on
assertion. The most likely mechanism is that members of dif-
ferent SSOs differ in their propensity to sell their SEPs-per-
haps partly because patents covering certain standards are
more attractive to NPEs. For example, the BIG-I members exist
in technology fields like computer networking that have a fairly
high rate of troll assertion (61% of non-SEPs). But trolls only
assert 31% of BIG-I SEPs. That may mean that the companies
that develop the patents are more likely to keep and assert
those patents and less likely to sell them to NPEs. By contrast,
53 The groupings in Table 4 are identical to those in Bekkers et al., supra note
30, and reflect our effort to increase within-group sample size for statistical analy-
sis by combining SSOs that work on similar technology. Most of the IEEE patents
relate to a single standard: 802.11, or Wi-Fi.
54 These differences are statistically significant for the Big-I, IEEE and
OTHTEL groups in a logistic regression.
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the situation seems to be the opposite in the IEEE, where NPEs
represent 70% of the non-SEPs asserted and 85% of the SEPs
asserted.
B. Litigation Outcomes
1. Nature of the Cases
We compared the win rates for SEP and non-SEP patents
using Lex Machina data. As with all litigation, most cases in
our sample settled (75.9%) or were resolved on procedural
grounds (16.1%). Only 8% (247 patent-case pairs) went to mer-
its judgment.
SEP cases were significantly more complex than non-SEP
cases, generating over one-third more docket entries than non-
SEP cases (a mean of 230 entries for non-SEPs and 308 for
SEPs).56
For purposes of our merits analysis, we ran several alter-
native specifications. In the first, we included every case in-
volving the patents in our sample. In the second, we dropped
all but the first case filed on each patent so that our results
were not skewed by the same patent being held infringed (or
not infringed) multiple times in different decisions, since those
decisions are not likely to be truly independent. Selecting only
the first case filed increased the share of cases that went to a
merits decision from 8% to 15% of tested cases. That makes
some intuitive sense, as later-filed cases involving the same
patent are more likely to be stayed or transferred, and may also
be more likely to settle after the resolution of the first suit. We
also ran an alternative specification in which we selected only
one random patent from each lawsuit. Previous work has
shown that patents that are litigated together generally share
the same fate,56 so this alternative specification avoids a differ-
ent sort of interdependence problem.
2. Effect of Standard-Essential Patents
Interestingly, selecting only the first case for each patent
(though not selecting only one patent for each case) signifi-
55 That difference was statistically significant (p=0.01). Jay Kesan and
Gwendolyn G. Ball have used the number of docket entries as a rough measure of
the cost and complexity of a lawsuit, or at least how hard-fought it is. Jay P.
Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Exami-
nation of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
237, 246 (2006).
56 Allison & Lemley, supra note 41, at 245; John R. Allison et. al, Understand-
ing the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEx. L. REV. 1769, 1796 (2014).
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cantly changed the merits outcomes. Considering all the pat-
ent-case pairs in our sample, patentees won 41.7% of the cases
that went to a merits judgment.5 7
TABLE 5: WIN RATES OF CASES REACHING A MERITS
DETERMINATION BY SEP STATUS 58
First-Case
All Assertions per Patent
Control SEP Control SEP
Claimant Win 39% 42% 52% 67%
Total Assertions (N) 123 117 54 54
Pearson Chi-square p 0.652 0.117
There was no significant difference between SEP and non-SEP
win rates. The same was true when we selected one random
patent from each case (to avoid near-collinearity among suits
that involve multiple related patents). In that sample, paten-
tees won 50 of 140 cases, or 35.7%. There was no significant
difference between SEPs and non-SEPs in that sample either.
Indeed, in that sample the win rates of SEPs and non-SEPs
were identical (35.7% for non-SEPs and 35.6% for SEPs).
But when we dropped all but the first case filed on each
patent, patentees did much better, winning 59% of the cases
that went to judgment. SEPs won 66.7% while non-SEPs won
51.9%. Both numbers are quite a bit higher than the overall
win rate for patentees in general, and particularly for patentees
in the computer and telecommunications industries in which
our patents are concentrated.5 9
The difference in outcomes between our specifications sug-
gests that patentees in our sample (both SEP and non-SEP
patent owners) who litigate multiple cases to judgment may
win their first case but eventually are likely to lose. This may
simply be survivor bias-if a patent is invalidated in the first
case it can't be enforced against anyone else.6 0 And even if it is
found not infringed in the first case the incentive to sue again
may be significantly reduced. But if not, it suggests a variance
57 We include only substantive rulings in the definition of a merits judgment
and exclude decisions on procedural questions such as venue or personal
jurisdiction.
58 Most cases settle or are resolved on non-merits grounds. Appendix C
reports the full results, including those categories.
59 John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073,
1097-98, 1098 tbl.3 (2015); Allison et al., supra note 56, at 1787-88.
60 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
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in outcomes in different cases involving the same patent, a
variance that will hurt patentees more than accused infringers,
since they will be bound by the effects of their losses.
None of the differences between SEPs and non-SEPs were
statistically significant. That itself is a very interesting result.
We would expect SEPs to be stronger than non-SEPs, but that
doesn't turn out to be true in cases litigated to judgment.6 1
3. Effect of NPE Status
Next, we measured how different entity types fared in our
study. We report the results for the narrower definition of
NPEs discussed above, treating any company that makes prod-
ucts or is a subsidiary of one that does as a product company.
The results are dramatic and statistically significant.
TABLE 6: WIN RATES BY NPE STATUS 6 2
All Assertions SEP Cases Only
Implementer NPE Implementer NPE
Claimant Win 72% 13% 71% 6%
Total Assertions (N) 102 120 62 53
Pearson Chi-square
p-value 0.000 0.000
The results are equally striking when we use either of our alter-
native samples-indeed, even more dramatic. If we count only
the first case for each patent, practicing entity patentees won
72.3% of their cases while NPEs won only 5.7%.63 And they are
statistically significant (p=0.OO). Practicing entities in our
study win their cases at more than twice the rate of NPEs. That
is consistent with other work showing that NPEs fare worse in
litigation outcomes than other plaintiffs generally." But it is
worth noting that practicing entities in our study did quite well,
better than practicing entities generally or in the IT fields in
other studies.6 5 It is not clear what explains this discrepancy,
61 While in one of our specifications-the one-case-per-patent sample-the
win rate for SEPs was higher than for non-SEPs, that result was not statistically
significant (p=0.29).
62 Appendix D reports the results including non-merits cases and
settlements.
63 If we count only one patent per case, practicing entity patentees won 72.5%
of their cases while NPEs won only 22.9%.
64 John R. Allison et al, How Often do Non-Practicing Entities Win Patent
Suits?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 268-69 (2017), https://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2750128 [https://perma.cc/N4KC-BNYPI.
65 Id. at 274, 277.
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but it may trace back to the nature of the patents we have
selected, which are either SEPs or are matched to them and
therefore are unrepresentative of litigated patents more
generally.
NPEs did significantly better in the broader alternative
specification, winning 30% of their cases-still far less than
practicing entities, but twice as many cases as in the narrower
definition of NPE we report here.6 6 The difference between the
two specifications is interesting. It suggests that entities that
don't themselves make products but are closely connected with
those who do-failed startups, for instance, and IP holding
subsidiaries of product companies-do just fine in litigation. It
is those with no connection to a practicing entity that fare
poorly in court.
The interaction of the NPE and SEP characteristics for
cases litigated to judgment was even more striking. As we
show in Table 7, practicing entities win virtually the same per-
centage of their SEP and non-SEP cases. NPEs, by contrast,
win many fewer cases. But they are particularly unlikely to win
their SEP cases, winning only 6% of them. The difference in
win rates between the SEPs and non-SEPs asserted by NPEs is
highly statistically significant (p=0.OO).
TABLE 7: PATENTEE WIN RATE PERCENTAGE BY
NPE AND SEP STATUS 6 7
Declared Matched
SEP Control
Implementer 71% 73%
NPE 6% 19%
66 We present the data from that alternative specification in Appendix B.
67 These data include plaintiff wins on default judgments. If we exclude
default judgments, the win rates change modestly, as shown in Appendix E.
The statistical significance of the results does not change. There were many
substantive decisions classified by Lex Machina as consent judgments.
Interestingly, almost all of them were judgments for defendants in NPE SEP cases.
That struck us as surprising, since consent decrees generally favor patentees. We
investigated those decisions. Each of them involved a claim construction decision
unfavorable to the patentee, after which the patentee stipulated to
noninfringement in order to appeal the claim construction decision. While that
type of result is literally a consent judgment, it is for all practical purposes a
substantive win on noninfringement by the defendant. So we kept these cases in
our data set.
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4. Does Infringement or Validity Explain the Results?
We tested whether the similar SEP and non-SEP win rates
illustrated in Table 5 are a result of our offsetting hypotheses
discussed above-that SEPs are more likely to be infringed but
may also be more likely to be held invalid. For this test, unlike
previous ones, we look at interim as well as final merits rulings,
such as denials of summary judgment. We find that neither
part of our hypothesis holds up. SEPs are no more likely to be
found infringed than non-SEPs. Of the 215 infringement deci-
sions in our study, 127 involved SEPs and 88 did not. The SEP
infringement win rate was 30.7%, not appreciably (or statisti-
cally) different than the non-SEP infringement win rate of
29.5%. When we restricted our sample to the first case involv-
ing each patent, we were left with 71 observations, 41 of which
involved SEPs. While SEPs won more of those cases (46.3% as
opposed to 33.3%), the results were not statistically significant
(p=0.28).
We did find significant differences between SEPs and non-
SEPs when it came to validity, but not in the direction we
expected. SEPs were more likely to be held valid. Of the 100
validity decisions in our study, 49 involved SEPs and 51 did
not. The SEP validity win rate was 83.7%, significantly higher
than the non-SEP validity win rate of 60.8% (p=0.01). The
statistical results were the same for the restricted sample in-
volving only the first suit on each patent. Thus, surprisingly,
SEPs do no better in infringement cases than their matched
non-SEP counterparts, but are less likely to be held invalid.
When we add in the effect of NPE status, we see one notice-
able difference. NPEs fare worse than practicing entities in all
infringement decisions, but there isn't much difference be-
tween SEPs and non-SEPs once we know what kind of entity is
asserting the patent.
TABLE 8A: INFRINGEMENT AND VALIDITY RATE BY
PATENT AND ENTITY TYPE
Infringement Validity
Rate Rate
SEP Control SEP Control
Implementer 42% 39% 80% 75%
NPE 21% 20% 88% 52%
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TABLE 8B: INFRINGEMENT AND VALIDITY DECISIONS (COUNT) BY
PATENT AND ENTrlY TYPE
Infringement Validity
Decisions Decisions
SEP Control SEP Control
Implementer 59 31 25 20
NPE 66 49 24 23
When it comes to validity, however, we do see a difference
in results. NPEs do better on validity with SEPs than non-
SEPs, and indeed do better even than practicing entities. But
parsed this finely, the numbers of cases are relatively small and
the differences are not statistically significant.68
IV
IMPLICATIONS
Our study has produced at least three interesting findings.
First, despite their name, SEPs don't seem to be all that essen-
tial. At least, they aren't often found infringed. Second, when
SEPs go to court they don't fare significantly differently than
other patents of similar age and type. Third, NPEs do very
poorly even when they assert SEPs. In this section we leave the
world of reporting data and consider some possible policy im-
plications of these findings.
A. Maybe SEPs Aren't So Essential After All
One implication seems to be that overdisclosure of SEPs is
rampant. When SEPs are asserted in court, most of them turn
out not to be infringed.6 9 That is a surprising finding for a set
68 Because we report in this section decisions on either infringement or valid-
ity, even if they did not finally resolve the case, the universe of decisions in this
section does not completely overlap with the discussion of final rulings in prior
sections. We do find that NPEs settle SEP cases-but not other cases-much
more frequently after a partial win on either validity or infringement than do
practicing entities. So the low win rate for NPEs on SEPs at judgment may in part
reflect the fact that NPEs settle their best cases after a partial win rather than
taking them to judgment.
69 While it is possible that the SEPs are being asserted against devices that do
not practice the standard, that seems unlikely to explain most of our cases. When
plaintiffs assert SEPs in litigation they are likely to assert them against the stan-
dard they purport to cover. And in many cases, adoption of that standard is
sufficiently widespread that almost any defendant uses it. It would be surprising
to sue on a patent that covers a standard widely used in the industry but to assert
that something other than that standard infringes a patent on the standard.
Nonetheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that that is happening in some of
the cases we observe.
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of patents that were declared essential to the standard by par-
ticipants in the SSO at the time the standard was adopted.
These are not patents only claimed to cover a successful stan-
dard years later in litigation, a circumstance in which we might
expect strategic overclaiming in an effort to reach the stan-
dard.7 0 The overclaiming of patents as standard-essential
seems to happen much earlier than litigation, often when the
standard itself is adopted. 7 ' And it is done by the participants
in the standard-setting process themselves, not those who later
have an incentive to read the patent creatively to cover some-
thing it was not intended to reach.
There is prior evidence that suggests that overdisclosure of
SEPs is common.7 2 Companies might rationally err on the side
of disclosing rather than concealing, perhaps because they
might view it as giving them an advantage in later royalty nego-
tiations but also because the failure to disclose SEPs might
violate the antitrust laws. 7 3  Some literature suggests that
downstream firms and those with weaker patents tend towards
70 In the ongoing Apple-Qualcomm litigation, Qualcomm has identified 1800
patents that it claims are essential to telecommunications standards Apple uses,
most of which were disclosed to ETSI. Scott Graham, Federal Judge Looking to
Pare Back Apple-Qualcomm Dispute, THE RECORDER, (Oct. 14, 2017), https://
www.law.com/therecorder/almlD/ 1202800451514/Federal-Judge-Looking-to-
Pare-Back-AppleQualcomm-Dispute/?mcode= 1202617583863&curindex=24
[https://perma.cc/KU53-3M791.
71 Some companies did engage in late disclosure, adding patents after the
formal adoption of the standard. We do not distinguish those patents in our
study, and it is possible they have different characteristics than patents disclosed
ex ante.
72 See, e.g., Jason R. Bartlett & Jorge L. Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND
Royalties: Can Interpleader Save the Internet of Things?, 36 REv. LITIG. 285,
300-01 (2017) ("Rlecent studies [have found] variably that [only] 28%, 29% and
50% of patent families declared 'essential' to ETSI's 2G, 3G and 4G wireless
telecommunications standards . . . were actually essential . . . ."); Jorge L. Con-
treras, supra note 6, at 222-23 (referencing a Cyber Creative study that found
only 56% of sampled SEPs were "truly" essential, 29% were partially essential,
and 15% were not essential at all); Stitzing et al., supra note 6, at 10 (noting that
over-declaration rates of SEPs could be as high as 80%). Prior work that has
delved into the technology has concluded that only about a quarter of the patents
declared essential to a standard actually are. Goodman & Myers, supra note 15,
at 4; Fairfield Resources Int'l, Analysis of Patents Declared as Essential to GSM as
ofJune 6, 2007 (Dec. 31, 2007) (27% of GSM cellular technology); Fairfield Re-
sources Int'l, Review of Patents Declared as Essential to WCDMA Through Decem-
ber 2008, (Jan. 6, 2009) (28% of WCDMA cellular technology). Our results are
broadly consistent with that work.
73 In re Union Oil Co. Cal., 138 F.T.C. 1, 113-18 (2004); In re Dell Computer
Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 624-25 (1996); cf. In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL
2330117, at *3, *11, *19-20 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006) (finding that Rambus, a devel-
oper of computer memory technologies, violated the Sherman Act by failing to
disclose certain SEPs).
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broader disclosures than firms with specific technologies that
are actually essential inputs.7 4
Policy makers have mostly worried about the problem of
strategic nondisclosure because it permits a patent owner to
lure an SSO into adopting a standard without understanding
the full costs of implementation. The patent owner could then
hold up adopters of the standard, charging a higher royalty
after the industry becomes locked in to the standard.7 5
Rambus engaged in just such a strategy.7 6
It is less clear that we should be troubled by overdisclosure
as a policy matter. True, claiming as standard-essential pat-
ents that aren't creates clutter, and so it might increase the
cost of figuring out what licenses we need. It might also distort
the true cost of a standard, making it appear more encumbered
than it is or changing the allocation of royalties among patent
owners.7 7 That risk will be compounded if courts use counts of
declared essential patents to apportion royalties in damages
calculations, as some have done.78 If a FRAND royalty is deter-
mined by how many other patents have been declared essen-
74 Josh Lerner et al., Patent Disclosures and Standard-Setting, 4, 13 (Nat'1
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22768, 2016); Bekkers et al., supra
note 6, at 3.
75 Lemley & Shapiro, Holdup, supra note 2, at 2009, 2016.
76 Id.; Mark R. Patterson, Commentary, Antitrust and the Cost of Standard-
Setting: A Commentary on Teece & Sherry, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1995, 2001 n.33
(2003) (referring to the different royalties Rambus charged).
77 See Contreras, supra note 6, at 224-25 (making this point and suggesting
solutions).
78 TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. 14-
CV-341, 2017 WL 6611635, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) ("The Court adopts a
simple patent counting system which treats every patent as possessing identical
value . .. ."); GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. 12-CV-2885, 2014 WL 1494247, at
*7-10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2014) (admitting expert testimony based on a patent
counting approach where the expert adjusted her final royalty figure based on the
value of the asserted patent relative to the other standard-essential patents). But
see Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (re-
jecting a modifled patent counting method because "proof of damages must be
carefully tied to the claimed invention itself"); Golden Bridge Tech. v. Apple Inc.,
No. 12-CV-4882, 2014 WL 2194501, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2014) ("If anything,
the case law is clear that mere patent counting and dividing is not enough."); In re
Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11-CV-9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *39 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 3, 2013) (choosing a particular method to calculate a RAND royalty rate in
part because the "proposal does not apportion to the value of Innovatio's patented
features based solely on the numerical proportionality of Innovatio's patents" and
can instead "account for its conclusion that Innovatio's patents are of moderate to
moderate-high importance to the standard"); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No.
10-CV-1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *80 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) ("Another
problem with using patent pools as the de facto RAND royalty rate is that the
patent-counting royalty allocation structure of pools does not consider the impor-
tance of a particular SEP to the standard . . . .").
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tial, which makes some sense,7 9 overdeclaration can skew the
royalty payments towards companies that overdeclare and
away from those that don't. It can also complicate the adoption
of standards.
At the same time, overdisclosure of patents can benefit the
world. Most SSOs (and almost all of the ones in our study)
require that disclosed SEPs be licensed on specified terms,
most commonly on FRAND terms but sometimes royalty-free.
Indeed, 322 of the 355 patents in our study were encumbered
by such a requirement, and a FRAND requirement applied to
317 of those patents. Those commitments should bind their
patent owners even if the patent wasn't truly essential and so
did not have to be disclosed at all.80 So overdisclosure of pat-
ents may mean overgenerous licensing-patentees making
concessions (such as the absence of injunctive relief)8 ' that
they didn't have to make. 82 We can see why patentees wouldn't
want to do that; that's why we worry about them hiding SEPs
until after the standard has been chosen. But if they decide
(deliberately or accidentally) to err in the other direction, soci-
ety may benefit by getting license terms (like the absence of
injunctions or treble damages) it wouldn't otherwise have been
able to insist on. It may also get more transparency about
patent ownership of related technologies.
79 Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 627, 637-38 (2010); Lemley &
Shapiro, Simple Approach, supra note 2, at 1151-52.
80 While that is not a foregone conclusion, a party who represents a patent as
essential to a standard should be read as committing to license that patent, even
if it turns out that they were wrong to consider it essential. See Lemley, IP &
SSOs, supra note 7, at 1967; Merges & Kuhn, supra note 20, at 7-10.
81 See, e.g., FTC Patent Standards Workshop, Comments of gualcomnm Incor-
porated, Project No. P11-1204, at 39-43 (June 13, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/request-comments-and-an
nouncement-workshop-standard-setting-issues-proj ect-no.p 111204-
00011%C2%AO/00011-60525.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UYZ-FET3] (noting that
"the Commission has suggested that in the standard-setting context, a patentee's
prior RAND commitment should be considered powerful evidence ... that injunc-
tive relief should be denied").
82 A FRAND commitment should extend to patents declared to be essential to
a standard, even if they turn out not to be (as many apparently do). Contreras,
supra note 6, at 224; see also Shapiro, Navigating, supra note 7, at 147 n.25
("[SSO terms] can create the perverse incentive for patent holders to assert that at
least some of their patents are not in fact essential . . . ."). So, a patentee that
overdiscloses is restricting their remedies for patents they could otherwise have
enforced without restriction. That restriction applies only to cases brought
against implementation of the standard, however. A FRAND commitment
shouldn't prevent enforcement of the patent against a defendant who infringes in
a way other than using the standard.
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The nonessential nature of many "essential" patents has a
final implication for current policy debates. Some have sought
to counter the problem of patent holdup and royalty stacking
with objections to "holdout," arguing that defendants who re-
fuse to pay patent licenses are creating an economic problem
parallel to holdup.8 3 That argument fails on its own terms as a
matter of economic theory; unlike holdup, where there is col-
lective action to create the standard and the patent holder has
committed to license implementers on FRAND terms, holdout
involves unilateral conduct by an alleged infringer that has
made no prior promise to take a license. In that respect,
holdout is no different from ordinary patent infringement,
which can be corrected by suing the alleged infringer and ob-
taining damages or an injunction.8 4 But even if it were a prob-
lem as a matter of theory, our data undermines the basis for
the holdout story. Accused infringers are right not to just pay
up in most cases involving declared SEPs; most of them turn
out not to be essential after all.
B. Maybe SEPs Aren't So Special After All
Second, we find surprisingly little difference between SEPs
and matched non-SEPs overall. There are some important dif-
ferences between the patents in our study and the results in
patent cases overall. Specifically, both the SEP and non-SEPs
in our sample do better than ordinary patents in other studies,
for which the patentee win rate has stayed unchanged at about
25% for some time.8 5 And they definitely do better than normal
IT patents, for which the win rate is lower than for most other
industries.8 6 But it is interesting that those differences don't
seem to be driven by a patent's standard-essential status.
83 Indeed, the Trump Administration has taken the position that holdout is a
bigger problem than holdup. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks
at IAM's Patent Licensing Conference in San Francisco: Antitrust Law and Patent
Licensing in the New Wild West (Sept. 18, 2018) (transcript available at https://
wwwjustice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-deiv-
ers-remarks-iam-s-patent-licensing [https://perma.cc/PJ3L-M879]).
84 See Timothy J. Muris, Bipartisan Patent Reform and Competition Policy
9-10 (George Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-46, Nov. 2018), available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3292476 [https://
perma.cc/W3XA-EB3B] (making this point).
85 Allison et al., supra note 59, at 1098; see also Paul M. Janicke & Lilan Ren,
Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 5 (2006) (finding that
patent owners won 25% of 262 dispositive cases studied); Mark A. Lemley, The
Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REv. 1, 25 (2016) (noting that
for over two decades, patent holders have consistently won around 25% of cases).
86 Allison et al., supra note 59, at 1098 tbl.3.
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This result may be related to the first. If many SEPs are
not in fact essential, it is less surprising that the win rates don't
diverge much between otherwise-similar SEPs and matched
non-SEPs. Maybe few of them are truly essential patents to
begin with. Another explanation for this finding is that selec-
tion of what patents to assert leads to similar litigation out-
comes. To the extent that plaintiffs have a choice, they will
assert non-SEPs only if the expected outcome at the margins
from asserting a non-SEP is better than asserting SEPs (and
vice versa), so a similar distribution of outcomes is not a total
surprise.
It is particularly notable that the patents in our study,
SEPs or not, do far better on validity issues than ordinary
patents, and certainly than ordinary IT patents. That does,
however, leave us with a puzzle: if it isn't because of SEP sta-
tus, why do patentees in our study do significantly better than
other patentees? We can't give a definitive answer to that ques-
tion. The difference in the win rate between our patents and
other studies may have more to do with the particular technol-
ogy area 7 or the age profile of the patents8 8 than with their
status as SEPs. Perhaps the characteristics of the patents in
our study look different than patents in those industries more
generally.89
87 There is a great deal of evidence that the nature of the patent system is
industry-specific. See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 59, at 1098 tbl.3 (finding
dramatic differences in patent win rates between industries); DAN L. BURK & MARK
A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRIsis AND How THE CouRTs CAN SOLVE IT (2009) and sources
cited therein (addressing how, despite the uniformity of legal rules covering patent
systems, the patent system itself allows for industry tailoring).
88 See, e.g., Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing:
Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Tr-olls Without Harming Innovators?, 161
U. PA. L. REv. 1309, 1340 (2013) (finding empirical support for the proposition
that NPEs are more likely to assert patent rights near the end of the patent term
than at the beginning).
89 There is a substantial literature using the metrics of patents as evidence of
patent value. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics:
The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677,
1677 (2007) (discussing the holdup arguments in the biotechnology industry);
Allison et al., supra note 44, at 2 (finding that the most-litigated patents are also
the most valuable patents); John R. Allison & Thomas W. Sager, Commentary,
Valuable Patents Redux: On the Enduring Merit of Using Patent Characteristics to
Identify Valuable Patents, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1769, 1769 (2007) (responding to criti-
cism of the use of patent characteristics to identify valuable patents); John R.
Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L. REV. 435, 435 (2004) (examining what
characteristics make a patent valuable); James Bessen, The Value of U.S. Patents
by Owner and Patent Characteristics, 37 REs. POL'Y 932, 932 (2008) (using renewal
data to estimate the value of U.S. patents); Dietmar Harhoff et al., Citation Fre-
quency and the Value of Patented Inventions, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 511, 511
(1999) (finding that full-term patents tend to be more valuable than patents
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Or perhaps it has to do with the nature of the parties. If the
plaintiffs in our patent cases are for some reason better posi-
tioned than ordinary plaintiffs, either as litigants (they are
more attractive to judges and juries) or as inventors, that might
translate into a different win rate. Still, the difference between
our findings and more general studies is large and surprising,
and we can't fully explain it. We do know one thing that doesn't
explain it: SEP status. There is no significant difference be-
tween the SEP patents in our study and matched patents that
aren't standard-essential.
That fact may have implications for antitrust as well as
patent law. We shouldn't assume that a declared essential
patent confers market power on its own, even if the standard is
widely adopted, because the patent itself might not truly be
essential.
C. NPEs Lose
In one respect, our evidence does demonstrate that who
owns the patent absolutely matters. While some NPE SEPs are
patents the NPE developed and disclosed in-house, many of the
patents NPEs asserted were owned by practicing entities at the
time they were disclosed to the SSO and later sold to an NPE.90
Indeed, Broadcom, Nokia (later Nokia Siemens Networks),
Nortel and Micron are all in the top ten list of original owners of
patents later asserted by NPEs in our data. Together, patents
sold by those four companies to NPEs account for more than a
third of all the NPE assertions and nearly a quarter of the
patents in our study.
allowed to lapse before the end of their term, and that among full-term patents,
citation frequency rises with reported economic value); Jean 0. Lanjouw et al.,
How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal
and Application Data, 46 J. INDuS. ECON. 405, 405 (1998) (discussing how patent
renewal and application data can be used to better understand the value of patent
law protections); Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and
Research Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. J.
441, 441 (2004) (finding that research productivity at the firm level is inversely
related to patent quality, and that patent quality is positively associated with the
stock market value of firms).
90 On the phenomenon of "privateering"-selling patents to NPEs to use to
harass competitors-see Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property
Rights by Corporations and Investors: IP Privateering and Modem Letters of Mar-
que and Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (2012); Tom Ewing & Robin
Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1, 63 (2012).
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TABLE 9A: TOP TEN OWNERS OF SEPS (AT TIME OF DISCLOSURE)
LATER ASSERTED BY NPEs (MEASURED BY ASSERTIONS)
NPE Assertions
Declaring Company (Count)
Elastic Networks 198
Broadcom 174
Nokia / NSN 63
InterDigital 43
Scanbuy 38
Micron 36
Ensemble Communications 35
Tesseron 32
VoiceAge 32
SPH America 29
TABLE 9B: TOP TEN OWNERS OF SEPs (AT TIME OF DISCLOSURE)
ASSERTED BY NPEs (MEASURED BY PATENTS)
NPE Asserted
Declaring Company Patents (Count)
InterDigital 17
Nokia / NSN 11
Ensemble Communications 10
Wi-Lan 9
Tesseron 6
Nortel Networks 5
Broadcom 4
Hybrid Networks 4
SPH America 4
VirnetX 4
NPEs that do not participate in SSOs have the advantage
that their patents aren't burdened by FRAND licensing require-
ments. So when NPEs do buy patents subject to a FRAND
requirement, we might expect that they take on that burden
because they think they are getting better patents as a result.9 1
NPEs do poorly even with what seem like they should be strong
91 Both NPEs and operating companies do, of course, also assert patents that
are not subject to a FRAND commitment because the original owner was not a
member of the SSO. For a study on the assertion of these "outsider" patents, see
Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards Outsiders and Unencum-
bered Patents, 12 J. COMPETTON L. & EcON. 1, 1 (2016).
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patents. And they do very poorly indeed. While practicing enti-
ties won 72% of the time, NPEs won only 13% of the time.92
And NPEs did even worse with SEPs, winning only 6% of those
cases. And just as a reminder, these aren't random patents
later asserted to cover a standard; they are patents that were
owned by participants in the organization and declared essen-
tial at the time the standard was adopted. Moreover, our defi-
nition of NPEs includes not just patent assertion entities,
which prior work has shown fare poorly across the board,9 3 but
other kinds of NPEs who have traditionally done better in
court.94
Why do NPEs do so poorly? We don't know the answer, but
we can envision several possible explanations.
First, it might be that the quality of the patents NPEs as-
serted in our cases was dramatically worse than the patents
asserted by practicing entities. They may have bought worse
patents, either deliberately or because they have less money,95
and they have incentives to assert or monetize all the patents
they buy, while practicing entities let many lie fallow.
There are some reasons to doubt the low-quality patents
explanation. We matched SEPs and non-SEPs by age, year
asserted, and patent class, removing those sources of observa-
ble variation. And the SEPs were all originally owned and iden-
tified by participants in the SSO. That doesn't exclude the
possibility that the original owners sold their lousy patents and
kept their good ones to assert, but the original owners had at
one point thought the patents were essential. Further, even if
that were true of the SEPs, it doesn't explain why NPEs did so
much worse when asserting non-SEPs from the same era and
in the same industry class. Previous work indicates that one
common type of NPE, patent assertion entities (PAEs) try to
purchase patents that seem to have objective indicia of value.9 6
92 See Appendix D.
93 Allison et al., supra note 64, at 237.
94 Id.
95 For empirical support for that proposition as a general matter, see Josh
Feng & Xavier Jaravel, Crafting Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Patent
Assertion Entities, Litigation, and Innovation 1, 4 (working paper Dec. 4, 2017)
(finding that patent assertion entities "overwhelmingly purchase and assert pat-
ents granted by 'lenient' examiners, who craft patents with higher litigation and
invalidity risks"); Brian Love et al., Determinants of Patent Quality: Evidence from
Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 70-71 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper Series No. 2018-06, Feb. 7, 2018) (finding that patents
issued by more lenient examiners are more likely to be challenged in IPR
proceedings).
96 Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology-
An Empirical Analysis of NPEs' Patent Acquisitions, 41 RES. POL'Y 1519, 1520
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And our data show that NPEs mostly lose on infringement, not
validity,9 7 suggesting that the problem isn't low patent quality.
Our data don't discount the possibility that the NPE-pur-
chased patents are significantly worse than the practicing-en-
tity patents and that this explains the difference in win rate.
There is a great deal of variation in patent quality that can't be
explained by objective metrics evident from the face of the pat-
ent itself. But the unobserved quality gap would have to be
quite large to explain the dramatic difference in NPE and prac-
ticing entity win rates.
Second, perhaps NPEs but not practicing entities are sys-
tematically over-asserting their patents. This hypothesis fits
the repeated anecdotal story of patent trolls filing suit against
an entire industry.9 8 It fits our data showing that NPEs file
more suits per patent than practicing entities. It also fits our
finding that even SEPs usually lose, not on invalidity, but on
noninfringement. Maybe the problem is that NPEs overreach,
and so are more likely to lose their cases. We think this is at
least a partial explanation for our results. But it can't be a full
explanation. NPEs lose on SEPs at an even higher rate than
they do on non-SEPs, and it seems unlikely that patentees are
systematically overclaiming the scope of SEPs, which are, after
all, supposed to be essential to the standard. It is possible that
they are buying primarily the supposedly-essential patents
that don't actually cover a standard (and that might be the
ones operating companies are most willing to sell).
Third, perhaps there is something about the nature of
NPEs that makes them less likely to win. That could conceiva-
bly be a matter of business strategy. If an NPE wants to settle
its case for money, perhaps it settles the good cases and only
ends up going to judgment if its case is so bad that no one will
(2012) (finding that the "probability that a traded patent is acquired by an NPE
rather than a practicing entity increases (a) in the scope of the patent, and thus
the probability that it is infringed; (b) in the patent density of the technology field,
and thus in the cost of substituting for the patented technology; and, most impor-
tantly and contrary to common belief (c) in the patent's technological quality, and
thus in its probability of being upheld in court"); see Michael Risch, Patent Troll
Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 460-61 (2012) (finding that "while measuring
patent quality is extremely difficult, the available information implies that NPE
patent quality is not drastically lower than other litigated patents.").
97 See supra section III.B.4.
98 There is evidence to support this. NPEs sue more defendants than practic-
ing entities. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narra-
tives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571,
1604 (2009) (finding that between 2000 and 2008, while NPEs brought only 19%
of the high-tech lawsuits, they brought these lawsuits against 28% of the unique
defendants).
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pay it. Or they may assert patents in bulk with less interest in
the outcome of any one patent. Practicing entities, by contrast,
might take a wider variety of cases to court because they may
be interested in injunctions or business outcomes other than
royalty payments. We're not persuaded that is likely. First,
NPEs don't settle their cases with significantly higher fre-
quency than other parties do.99 Second, the willingness to take
money should affect the universe of cases that settle but won't
necessarily skew cases that go to judgment towards weak
cases. A plaintiff with a weak case might just take less money
to settle the case. Indeed, most NPE settlements are for quite
small amounts of money, 100 less than it would cost to take the
case to trial. 101
NPE cases differ in other respects that might be more rele-
vant. They are more likely to be represented by solo practition-
ers or small law firms, often working on a contingent fee
basis.1 0 2 Perhaps those lawyers aren't as good as the big-firm
lawyers who more commonly represent practicing entity plain-
tiffs. Or perhaps they don't have as many resources to devote
to the case as big firms do, or as much incentive to do so given
the contingent fee.
Alternatively, it is possible that the low NPE win rates re-
flect the fact that judges and juries don't like them. There has
been a lot of public discussion and criticism of "patent
trolls," 0 3 and it may be that that criticism has taken root. Or
99 Compare the figures in Appendix D (showing settlement rates of 69-78%)
to John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 694 (2011) (finding settlement rates of 85-90%); but
see Risch, supra note 52, at 69 ("All else equal, the NPE litigation studied here was
shorter than nonNPE litigation, with higher settlement rates.").
100 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY AcnvIry: AN FTC STUDY 8-9,
10, 91 (2016).
101 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw AsS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 35 (2013)
(reporting the mean cost to take an NPE case to trial).
102 See Ronen Avraham & John M. Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another Unex-
pected Effect of Tort Reform 2 (2012), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractld=1878966 [https://perma.cc/5WAV-CS8P]; David L. Schwartz,
The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REv. 335,
380 (2012).
103 See, e.g., Edward J. Black, Patent Trolls and the Growing Toll on Innovation,
HUFFPOST (July 12, 2012, 3:26 PM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ed-
ward-j-black/patent-trolls-innovation_b1666542.html [https://perma.cc/
F2XP-T3UY] (arguing that "the toll patent wars are taking on our overall economy
and innovation is ultimately incalculable"); Brian Fung, The Supreme Court's Big
Ruling on 'Patent Trolls' Will Rock Businesses Everywhere, WASH. PosT (May 23,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/05/23/
the-supreme-court-just-undercut-patent-trolls-in-a-big-way/?utm-term=.
A36006df7603 [https://perma.cc/D8YC-LPD9] (discussing the effect the Su-
preme Court case TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods might have on where "patent trolls"
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perhaps a company in the business of buying and asserting
patents is simply a less sympathetic plaintiff than a company
that actually invents them. Even among practicing entities,
prior work suggests that patentees do better when they assert
patents they invented in-house than when they assert patents
they bought. 10 4 The fact that NPEs, and particularly PAEs, do
poorly across the board when they get to court might reflect
anti-troll animus-perhaps bias, or perhaps a conclusion that
they provide less value to society. 10 5 We have no way to evalu-
ate whether that is true, but it seems possible. And the fact
that otherwise similar patents do worse in the hands of NPEs
than in the hands of practicing entities does suggest that there
may be something about the plaintiff, not the patent, that
drives the results.
CONCLUSION
Standard-essential patents that go to judgment look quite
a bit like their non-essential counterparts. They don't appear
to be all that essential, at least judged by the large number that
lose on infringement. The most significant difference in our
data is between practicing entities and NPEs. Practicing enti-
ties win far, far more cases than NPEs, whether or not the
patents are essential. Our results suggest that we might focus
less attention as a matter of patent policy on the "special" case
of standard-essential patents and more attention on who
brings a patent lawsuit and why.
assert patent infringement claims); Haydn Shaughnessy, Patent Trolls are Now
Crushing Parts of the Developer Economy, FORBEs (July 4, 2013, 8:02 AM), https:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/haydnshaughnessy/2013/07/04/patent-trolls-are-
now-crushing-parts-of-the-developer-economy/ #3e0680e379b9 [https://
perma.cc/44ZE-CW9L] (arguing that small companies are defending against "pat-
ent trolls" by the companies themselves becoming "patent trolls"). One commenta-
tor has conducted an empirical study of NPE treatment in the media and found
that the media generally referred to NPEs as "patent trolls" and also generally
portrayed them in a negative light with little analysis or empirical support. Ed-
ward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in Linine, and Patent Reform, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REv. 113, 133-39 (2015).
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APPENDIX A
BREAKDOWN OF PLAINTIFF ENTITY TYPE
Control NPE Total
1 0 1,383 1,383
1,11 0 2 2
1,12,8 10 0 10
1,3 0 1 1
1,5 0 7 7
1,8 3 0 3
1,8,9 0 2 2
1,9 0 2 2
11 0 24 24
11,12,6,8 0 7 7
11,8 0 6 6
12 46 0 46
12,13,6,8 0 7 7
12,13,8 3 0 3
12,6,8 7 0 7
12,8 39 0 39
13 0 58 58
13,5 0 8 8
2,8 2 0 2
3 0 8 8
4 0 6 6
5 0 358 358
5,8 19 0 19
5,9 0 1 1
6 0 29 29
6,7 0 1 1
6,8 7 0 7
8 580 0 580
8,9 3 0 3
9 0 13 13
NA 0 3 3
Total 719 1,928 2,647
The numbered categories are briefly described in the Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset.
https://law.stanford.edu/projects/stanford-npe-litigation-dataset/#slsnav-brief-
dataset-methodology [https://perma.c/YMA5-FFFI.
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APPENDIX B
OVERALL WIN RATES BY ENTITY STATUS -
ALTERNATIVE NPE SPECIFICATION (ONE
RANDOMLY SELECTED PATENT PER CASE FILED)
Control NPE Total
Claimant Win 48 65.8% 47 30.3% 95 41.7%
Defendant Win 25 34.2% 108 69.7% 133 58.3%
APPENDIX C
RESOLUTION OF ALL CASES IN STUDY BY SEP
STATUS
First-Case
All Assertions per Patent
Control SEP Control SEP
Claimant Win 2.9% 3.4% 7.9% 10.2%
Defendant Win 4.6% 4.7% 7.3% 5.1%
Procedural 15.6% 16.7% 12.7% 10.7%
Settlement 76.8% 75.2% 72.1% 74.0%
Total Assertions (N) 1,630 1,442 355 354
Pearson Chi-square p 0.722 0.375
APPENDIX D
WIN RATES BY NPE STATUS
All Assertions SEP Cases Only
Implementer NPE Implementer NPE
Claimant Win 10.6% 1.0% 13.1% 0.4%
Defendant Win 4.0% 5.4% 5.0% 5.8%
Procedural 16.1% 15.7% 14.9% 17.0%
Settlement 69.3% 78.0% 67.0% 76.8%
Total Assertions (N) 719 1,928 357 863
Pearson C-square p 0.000 0.000
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APPENDIX E
PATENTEE WIN RATE PERCENTAGE BY NPE AND
SEP STATUS EXCLUDING DEFAULT
JUDGMENTS
Control NPE
Non-SEPs 73% 19%
SEPs 71% 6%
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